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Abstract
Evidence-based medicine frequently uses statistical hypothesis testing. In this
paradigm, data can only disconfirm a research hypothesis’ competitors: One tests
the negation of a statistical hypothesis that is supposed to correspond to the re-
search hypothesis. In practice, these hypotheses are often misaligned. For instance,
directional research hypotheses are often paired with non-directional statistical
hypotheses. Prima facie, one cannot gain proper evidence for one’s research hy-
pothesis employing a misaligned statistical hypothesis. This paper sheds lights on
the nature of and the reasons for such misalignments and it provides a thorough
analysis of whether they pose a threat to evidence-based medicine. The upshots
are that the misalignments are often hidden for clinicians and that although some
cases of misalignments can be partially counterbalanced, the overall threat is
non-negligible. The counterbalances either lead to methodological inadequacy (in
addition to the misalignment), loss of statistical power, or involve a (potential)
lack of information that could be crucial for decision making. This result casts
doubt on various findings of medical studies in addition to issues associated with
under-powered studies or the replication crisis.
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1 introduction
Evidence-based medicine (EBM) involves the statistical analyses of data. Such analyses
play a crucial role for evaluating whether a treatment is promising and for a clinician’s
recommendation regarding a patient’s therapy. ‘Evidence’ is a relative term; evidence
is evidence for or against something. A common approach to statistical analysis of
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data is statistical hypothesis testing. For instance, a clinician’s research hypothesis may
be that transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) has a positive effect on spinal cord
injury (SCI) patients. In this paradigm, data cannot directly support a hypothesis,
but only disconfirm its competitors. So, one examines the negation of the research
hypothesis, namely that TMS has no or a negative effect on SCI patients. If the
negation is disconfirmed, one can reason that the research hypothesis is indirectly
supported. One thus tests the negation of a statistical hypothesis that corresponds to
the research hypothesis (cf. Fig. 1).
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Figure 1: Indirect testing of a research hypothesis
It goes without saying that the reasoning involved in statistical hypothesis testing
is risky. The conclusion does not follow from the data. The amount of risk depends
on how well the sample reflects the population, on whether the samples have been
drawn independently of each other, on the statistical power of the study, etc. Moreover,
several researchers have argued that the results of hypothesis testing alone should
not be a decisive guide (e.g., Cohen 1994; Ioannidis 2005; Cumming 2012, ch. 1), and
some researchers reject dichotomous hypothesis testing and focus on other statistical
means, such as the so-called confidence intervals (e.g., Meehl 1978; Cumming 2012,
ch. 1). However, our main focus is not on these topics here. Instead, we are concerned
with a prevailing issue that prima facie poses a threat even to rather low-risk cases of
hypothesis testing or confidence interval calculations: Intuitively, it is essential that
the statistical hypothesis closely corresponds to the research hypothesis; it should align
with its claim. Take the previous example: The hypothesis that TMS has a positive
effect on SCI patients is directional.1 So, its corresponding statistical hypothesis should
feature the same direction. Yet, in EBM, often a non-directional hypothesis is used, such
as the negation of a so-called nil-null hypothesis.2 Nil-null hypotheses reflect the claim
that, say, there is no effect whatsoever. Accordingly, its negation reflects the claim that
the treatment of interest has some effect – of whatever direction. This misalignment of
pairing a directional research hypothesis with a non-directional statistical hypothesis
is not uncommon. The authors examined 30 papers in paraplegia research, which
1 We briefly discuss the normative issue of whether directional research hypotheses should be used in
evidence-based medicine at all in sect. 4.4.
2 Cho and Abe (2013) claim that this issue also prevails in business research, and given the reasons
provided in sect. 4, it is likely to be also found in other disciplines, e.g., psychology.
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were part of a systematic review on SCI trials (Zimmermann et al. 2019). 20 of the 30
papers feature such a misalignment and nonetheless involve conclusions regarding
the research hypotheses. Prima facie, such conclusions are illegitimate, as Casella and
Berger emphasize (1987, p. 106). Arguably, one cannot gain proper evidence for one’s
research hypothesis without an appropriately corresponding statistical hypothesis.
Yet, misalignments prevail in EBM. What are the reasons for this practice? Does it
pose a threat or is the misalignment benign upon closer examination?
This paper sheds light on these questions with an interdisciplinary approach,
combining insights from applied medical statistics and philosophical considerations.
We proceed as follows: In section 2, we briefly describe the basics of statistical
hypothesis testing in EBM. In section 3, we distinguish between different forms of a
misalignment between research hypotheses and statistical hypotheses. In section 4, we
provide basic reasons for the misalignment practice in EBM. Our upshots are (i) that
these reasons do not justify the misalignments and (ii) that the misalignments are often
hidden for clinicians. In section 5, we evaluate whether the misalignments pose a threat
to evidence-based medicine, with an eye on informed decision making by clinicians,
physicians, and patients. Our upshot is that some cases of misalignments can be
partially counterbalanced. However, the counterbalances either lead to methodological
inadequacy (in addition to the misalignment), loss of statistical power, or involve a
(potential) lack of information that could be crucial for informed decision making. The
threat is thus non-negligible. This result of our analysis casts doubt on various findings
of medical studies in addition to issues associated with under-powered studies (cf.,
e.g., Ioannidis 2005) or the fact that a substantial number of findings of medical studies
cannot be replicated (cf., e.g., Davis, R. 2014). In section 6, we suggest some remedies
to the misalignment practice.
2 statistical hypothesis testing in clinical studies
Statistical hypothesis testing is a form of inferential statistics. The aim is to infer
properties of a population (e.g., all SCI patients) by investigating a sample (e.g., 50
SCI patients). There have been extensive discussions about the vices and virtues
of this testing, but we do not want to go into detail here.3 The relation between
research hypotheses and statistical hypotheses is also crucial to statistical analyses
where estimating the effect size or confidence intervals is the primary goal.
Statistical hypothesis testing involves four central steps. First, a research hypothesis
is established that contains measurable variables for its evaluation, such as measures
of a patient’s electrical perceptual threshold (EPT). This step is also called operational-
ization.
3 For an overview see, e.g., Nickerson 2000; Gigerenzer 2004; Lecoutre and Poitevineau 2014.
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Second, the research hypothesis needs to be paired with a corresponding statistical
hypothesis. This requires setting up a specific statistical model for the collected
data. For instance, a statistical hypothesis could be concerned with the difference
∆ = µT − µP of mean electric perceptual thresholds under treatment and placebo
in a TMS study with SCI patients. To assess the research hypothesis that, say, the
treatment leads to an increased EPT compared to a placebo, one constructs a statistical
hypothesis that is supposed to align with the research hypothesis. This is the so-called
alternative hypothesis (H1), e.g., H1 : ∆ > 0. However, as mentioned before, its negation
is tested, i.e., the so-called null hypothesis (H0), e.g., H0 : ∆ ≤ 0. Importantly, H0s can
also be concerned with specific differences, e.g., H0 : ∆ ≤ 2 is also a fine H0.4
Third, the evidence against H0 can be quantified by calculating the so-called p-value.
This value is defined as the probability of observing data which is at least as ‘extreme’
as the data at hand, when H0 is true. For illustration, assume that the test statistic
(i.e., basically the empirical mean difference, multiplied with some scaling factor) in
the treatment-versus-placebo example is 1. Although this is a value greater than 0, it
could also be a result of by-chance differences. So, it is reasonable to calculate the
probability of getting a test statistic of 1 or even a larger value, given that the treatment
is not superior. This probability is illustrated in the first plot in Figure 2.
Fourth, the p-value is taken as the basis for a formal decision rule: H0 is rejected if
and only if the p-value is less than a pre-specified cutoff α, where often α = 0.05. So,
loosely speaking, if it is very unlikely to observe data like the one at hand under H0,
you do not trust in H0, where ‘very unlikely’ is specified by α. If the p-value is smaller
than α, the result is said to be statistically significant.
A decision based on the p-value can be wrong. There could be a false positive result
or type I error: the test is significant although H0 is true. Conversely, the test might not
be significant although H1 is true, which is a false negative result or a type II error (β).
1 - β is also called the statistical power. In regulatory guidelines, emphasis is placed on
keeping the type I error rate below a pre-specified threshold α, but also on determining
the number of samples or subjects that have to be included in the study to achieve
sufficient power (cf., e.g., ICH E9). The former can be accomplished by following the
aforementioned decision rule (i.e., rejecting the null hypothesis if p < α). For sample
size calculation, one has to specify α, the hypothesized effect size, the desired power
(e.g., 80 or 90%), and some nuisance parameters (e.g., the hypothesized variability
of data, other variances, correlations, depending on the particular hypothesis test).
In clinical studies, the hypothesized effect size needs to be at least as large as the
so-called minimal clinically important difference (MCID).
4 There are also cases where the null hypothesis is not the negation of the alternative hypothesis (e.g.,
when considering fixed point alternatives). However, since these cases are the exception rather than the
rule, they are not our main focus of this article, except for cases where they may serve as a potential
remedy for avoiding what we call ‘magnitude misalignment’ (see below).
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When calculating the p-value, one has to distinguish between one- and two-sided
testing problems. The EPT example above represents an instance of a so-called ‘one-
sided hypothesis testing problem’ because its H1 has one direction. In other settings,
for instance, when comparing two treatments in the development phase, a researcher
might only hypothesize that there is some difference in terms of efficacy. In this case,
the null hypothesis will be non-directional or two-sided, that is, H0 : µT − µP = 0 vs.
H1 : µT − µP 6= 0. The two cases are illustrated in Figure 2. In the one-sided case
(corresponding to the EPT example), the p-value is the right-tail probability, whereas
the probabilities in both tails are considered in the two-sided setting. The p-value for
the two-sided case in Figure 2 is twice the p-value for the one-sided case.
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Figure 2: One-sided vs. two-sided tests; Grey areas represent the p-values.
Hypothesis testing is centered around the p-value. But, as we have mentioned,
the hypothesized size of an effect plays an important role when it comes to the
power analysis and the sample size considerations for a given study. Nevertheless,
considering the actual effect size in a data set is not part of the formal decision rule
about H0 as such.5 It goes without saying that it is nonetheless important for informed
clinical decision making. We go back to this point in section 5.
In medical research, hypotheses are also evaluated by calculating so-called confi-
dence intervals. For instance, in order to test H0 : ∆ ≤ 0, one might check whether the
corresponding one-sided confidence interval contains 0 or not. In what follows, we
focus on p-values. But, as we indicate, the problems discussed may also arise when
using confidence intervals instead of p-values.
5 Note that it would be methodologically inadequate to exclusively consider effect sizes because by-chance
variations cannot be accounted for.
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3 prevailing misalignments between research hypotheses and sta-
tistical hypotheses
There is a variety of possible misalignments between research hypotheses and their
statistical hypotheses. We focus on two common ones, namely on what we call
direction misalignment and magnitude misalignment. A research hypothesis
and its statistical hypothesis are misaligned when the statistical hypothesis does not
reflect the direction of the research hypothesis or the magnitude of the effect stated in
the research hypothesis. The latter case is meant as follows: A directional research
hypothesis is typically not about an effect of whatever magnitude but about an effect
of a particular size. For instance, in clinical studies, the effect size needs to be at least
as large as the minimal clinically important difference (MCID). Ideally, the desired effect
size should be reflected in the corresponding statistical alternative hypothesis, too: For
example, one should consider setting H1 : µT − µP = δ or H1 : µT − µP ≥ δ, where δ
denotes the desired effect size, e.g., the MCID.6
Take as a paradigmatic example for direction misalignment a study by Der-
akhshanrad et al. 2015. Their research hypothesis is clearly directional: “The objective
of this study was to determine whether an integrated and an intensive outpatient
program would result in functional improvement of spinal cord injury (SCI) patients
[...].” (p. 860, our italics) However, they explicitly state that only two-sided tests were
used (p. 861), which implies that they used non-directional statistical hypotheses. 20 of
the 30 studies we reviewed feature such a misalignment. direction misalignment
might also occur in the other direction, e.g., when a non-directional research hypoth-
esis is tested with a one-sided test (presumably due to data-driven considerations).
But since such cases typically involve a conclusion to a matching directional research
hypothesis (rather than to the initial non-directional one), we do not focus on this
variant of direction misalignment.
A frequently occurring instance of misalignment in clinical studies features both
direction misalignment and magnitude misalignment: A directional research
hypothesis is paired with the negation of a statistical nil-null hypothesis, i.e., with
a thesis that reflects that there is no effect. The statistical hypothesis is then tested
with a two-sided test. This is a twofold misalignment: Although the research hypoth-
esis is about a directional effect, the statistical hypotheses are just concerned with
whether there is any effect (direction misalignment) of any magnitude (magnitude
misalignment). 17 of the 30 studies we reviewed feature such a twofold misalignment.
A less common form of a misaligned statistical hypothesis is a direction-matching
statistical hypothesis that does not reflect the magnitude claim (magnitude misalign-
ment). As Bigirumurame and Kasim emphasize (2017), such a misalignment is quite
6 As we indicated in footnote 4, in such cases H1 and H0 do not exhaust the parameter space.
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common in medical research. For instance, Jeong and Yoo conclude that air stacking
leads to significant improvement for cervical SCI patient (2015, p. 1952), although the
statistical hypotheses used in their study did not specify any effect magnitude.7
There is also one form of misalignment, which occurs at an earlier stage, and one
form of misalignment, which occurs at a later stage. The former occurs at the first
step of statistical hypothesis testing. We call it operationalization misaligment.8
It can occur when the measurable variables are chosen for the statistical evaluation.
For instance, positive differences in the mean electric perceptual threshold might not
adequately capture the hypothesis that the treatment leads to an improvement for
the SCI patients. The other form of misalignment occurs at the testing stage. We call
it testing misalignment. Recall the indirect testing method (cf. Fig. 1): One tests
the negated corresponding statistical hypothesis. There are cases, where the statis-
tical evaluation method tests a negated statistical hypothesis other than the initially
constructed one. For instance, non-parametric methods are often recommended as a
standard remedy or rule-of-thumb when the validity of the assumptions underlying
classical parametric tests (such as the t-test) are suspected (cf., e.g., Field 2000, p. 49).
However, non-parametric methods are based on statistical hypotheses other than the
ones used for parametric tests. Briefly, the effect measure that underlies frequently
used non-parametric tests like, for example, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, may
also detect effects other than a shift of the group means (i.e., the parametric effect
measure). So, if a non-parametric method is used post hoc and one draws conclusions
regarding one’s research hypothesis, one reasons based on a non-matching negated
statistical hypothesis. Importantly, operationalization misaligment and testing
misalignment can occur independently of whether the initial statistical hypothesis is
aligned.
Analyzing operationalization misaligment and testing misalignment is a
project on its own. In what follows, we focus on direction and magnitude misalign-
ment.
4 reasons for the prevailing misalignments
We identified four basic reasons for the misalignments between research hypotheses
and their statistical hypotheses in medical research: the taught error, the practical
enforcement, the aim of conservative testing, and the aim of research open-
mindedness. Our upshots are that these reasons do not justify the misalignment
practice and that the misalignments are often hidden for clinicians.
7 In fact, Jeong and Yoo’s study also features direction misalignment. They conclude from two-sided
tests that there is a significant improvement (cf., e.g., Jeong and Yoo 2015, p. 1952).
8 We owe this suggestion to Gerit Pfuhl.
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4.1 The taught error
The first reason is that misalignments occur in teaching of statistical testing. This issue
comes in at least three flavors: The first is that directional research hypotheses are
not uncommonly paired with non-directional statistical hypotheses, when illustrating
hypothesis testing. Consider the following case (Cumming 2012, p. 21):
Suppose we want to know whether the new treatment for insomnia is better
than the old. To use NHST [Null hypothesis significance testing] we test the null
hypothesis that there’s no difference between the two treatments in the population.
So, Cumming effectively suggests that to test a directional research hypothesis
one should use a statistical nil-null hypothesis. To test whether the treatment is better
one tests a statistical hypothesis that reflects the claim that the treatment does not
make any difference whatsoever (e.g., H0 : ∆ = 0). So, H1 is ∆ 6= 0, which does
not correspond to the directional research hypothesis. Here, a misalignment case is
given as a paradigmatic example. A less extreme case is stating a statistical nil-null
hypothesis along with a directional research hypothesis (cf., e.g., Hacking 2001, ch. 18).
Although this does not imply that these hypotheses are paired, it is at least suggested.
A related issue is that some textbooks suggest that one can conclude from a statistically
significant p-value for the nil-null hypothesis that a directional statistical hypothesis is
(indirectly) supported (and thus a corresponding directional research hypothesis). For
instance, Machin, Cambell, and Walters illustrate hypothesis testing with the following
example: The blood pressure of patients is examined before and after exercise. The
p-value calculated for a nil-null hypothesis is statistically significant. Machin et al.
then claim that “[...] there is sufficient evidence to [...] accept the [statistical] alternative
hypothesis that there is a difference (a rise) in the mean blood pressure of middle-aged
men before and after exercise” (2007, p. 108). Yet, the difference need not be a rise.
Without additional considerations, one cannot conclude anything directional from
rejecting a non-directional statistical hypothesis.
Second, the fact that H0 is the negation of a thesis which is supposed to reflect the
research hypothesis is often not emphasized or not even mentioned. For instance,
Cumming writes (2012, p. 21):
Many textbooks describe NHST as a series of steps, something like this:
1. Choose a null hypothesis [i.e., H0] [...] Sometimes, in addition to specifying
H0, an alternative hypothesis, H1 is also specified.
This idea of first choosing some H0 and then perhaps additionally specifying
H1 neglects the fact that H1 is supposed to correspond to the research hypothesis
and that H0 is the negation of H1. A less extreme case is exemplified by Machin,
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Cambell, and Walters’ claim that “[...] the null hypothesis [i.e., H0] is often the negation
of the research hypothesis [...]” (2007, p. 106, our italics). This is misleading. H0
cannot negate the research hypothesis because the latter is not a statistical hypothesis.
Moreover, H0 should negate the hypothesis that reflects the research hypothesis, i.e.,
H1. It is no surprise that neither the direction of nor the magnitude involved in the
research hypothesis is of great concern throughout these textbooks. We found this
neglect in other textbooks, too (cf., e.g., Bland 2000; Kirkwood and Sterne 2003; Everitt
2006).
The third issue affects magnitude misalignment. In some textbooks, it is suggested
that H0s simply are nil-null hypotheses (cf. Altman 1991, p. 165; Bland 2000, ch. 9.1;
Kirkwood and Sterne 2003, p. 59; Everitt 2006, p. 165; Machin et al. 2007, p. 106).
Authors like Altman thus unsurprisingly state that “[...] there is no direct reference in
this [testing] method to the magnitude of the effect of interest [...]” (cf. Altman 1991,
p. 166, his italics). Yet, as we have seen, point hypotheses can be used as H1.
the taught error is linked to the practical enforcement.
4.2 The practical enforcement
the practical enforcement is the fact that two-sided tests seem to be the norm
in practically relevant settings. There are at least three reasons for this. The first is
that some popular statistical methods only involve two-sided tests. For instance, for
comparing the means of several groups – without any incorporation of co-variates
– the so-called Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) F-test is often used. ANOVAs only
involve two-sided tests. The null hypothesis is here H0 : µ1 = . . . = µa, where µ1
denotes the mean of group 1, and so forth. However, the H0 is rejected if and only
if the test statistic exceeds a certain cutoff value, which is determined based on the
so-called (central) F-distribution. This structure of the rejection criterion for certain
two-sided tests like the ANOVA might give the false impression of being a one-sided
test procedure, although in fact, a two-sided hypothesis is tested, as emphasized by
Kaiser (1960) and Cho and Abe (2013, p. 1261). Another example is the Chi-square test,
which is frequently used for the analysis of contingency tables. A related example
stems from a vivid debate about how to specify the previously mentioned type I error
bound α. A large group of researchers from renowned institutions recently opted for
a much lower standard, namely 0.005 (Benjamin, D. et al. 2017).9 In their paper, they
also argue for a statistical method to overcome certain problems. Yet, this proposal is
concerned with two-sided testing.
The second reason is concerned with statistical tools; for some frequently encoun-
tered settings, it is more straightforward to access two-sided tests in statistical software
9 Similar demands are voiced by, e.g., Berger and Sellke 1987; Nickerson 2000; Colquhoun 2014.
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packages (such as SPSS and R) than one-sided ones. For instance, when using multiple
regression models, the regression coefficients are usually tested for significant differ-
ences from 0 by two-sided test procedures. Although this might be appropriate when
using regression techniques for exploratory purposes (e.g., variable selection), the risk of
misalignment is increased in confirmatory settings. For instance, regression models are
frequently used for comparing means between several groups (e.g., treatment groups)
while adjusting for several co-variates (e.g., baseline measurements of the outcome
variable of interest). In this case, the significance of the coefficient corresponding to the
group indicator variable is of primary interest. However, a two-sided p-value provided
by the statistical software does not correspond to a directional research hypothesis.
The third reason is that guidelines for good scientific (statistical) practice might
(perhaps involuntarily) discourage researchers from using one-sided tests. For instance,
according to the New England Journal of Medicine guidelines, all reported p-values
should be two-sided, except when one-sided tests are required by study design, such
as in non-inferiority trials (cf. https://www.nejm.org/author-center/new-manuscripts).
The ICH statistical principles for clinical trials E9 state that researchers must provide
a clear justification if they decide to use a one-sided test instead of a two-sided one
(ICH E9, section 5.5). Thus, it seems that two-sided tests are the default and one-sided
tests are the more difficult cases.
In light of the taught error and the practical enforcement, it seems plausible
to hypothesize that the misalignments we pointed out in section 3 are often hidden
for clinicians who conduct studies. They apply what they have learned and what
popular statistical tests, common statistical software packages, and guidelines seem
to (involuntarily) encourage. Additionally, our review suggests that clinicians do
not always pay special attention to the directionality of the theses involved. In the
30 papers we examined, the directions of all hypotheses involved are clearly stated
in 3 only. Although these findings do not mean that the respective authors do not
care about directionality – the papers might only cover a part of their considerations
– they indicate that there is some lack of awareness concerning the alignment of
research and statistical hypotheses. Yet, none of the reasons discussed so far justify
the misalignment practice. For instance, using ANOVAs does not justify testing a
non-directional statistical hypothesis to reason about a directional research hypothesis.
the taught error and the practical reinforcement are no accident. They are at
least partially motivated by two theoretical reasons, namely the aim of conservative
testing and the aim of research open-mindedness.
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4.3 The aim of conservative testing
As Cho and Abe highlight (2013), there are theoretical reasons for using two-sided
tests instead of one-sided tests. The first reason is the worry that one-sided tests are
not rigorous enough. It has been argued that statistical significance can typically be
obtained more easily by using one-sided tests instead of two-sided tests (cf. Kimmer
1957; Braver 1975; Altman 1991, p. 171; Howell 2007, pp. 98-100). In the one-sided
setting, the p-value is smaller than for the corresponding two-sided test since the latter
is the accumulation of the probabilities in both tails (cf. Fig. 2). So, as a safeguard
against potential criticism regarding ‘fishing for significance’, researchers might prefer
conducting two-sided tests. When it comes to the calculation of one-sided confidence
intervals, there might be an additional issue with respect to interpretation, since one
of the confidence interval limits is infinite.
Note, however, that the rigor achieved with two-sided tests with respect to the
type I error rate comes at the price of losing power (i.e., with a reduced probability
of detecting a statistically significant effect, given that the intervention is indeed
efficacious). Moreover, using two-sided tests might also be sub-optimal due to the fact
that usually, in contrast to the directional setting, uniformly most powerful tests can
only be obtained under additional restrictions on the classes of test statistics.10
4.4 The aim of research open-mindedness
The second theoretical reason in favor of two-sided tests is that one-sided tests violate
the aim of research open-mindedness. One-sided tests carry the risk of not catching
effects in the direction opposite to the initial assumption (cf., e.g., Altman 1991, p. 171;
Dubey 1991; Bland 2000, ch. 9.5; Ruxton and Neuha¨user 2010; Cho and Abe 2013).
For instance, consider a study where the research hypothesis is that a new treatment
yields an average quality of life score that is larger than under the current gold
standard treatment. But the study data show that the average quality of life score was
substantially lower in the group receiving the new treatment. Using a one-sided test,
the statistical significance of this adverse result cannot be assessed, and this potentially
important unexpected finding might thus not be adequately considered and reported.
But, importantly, the aim of research open-mindedness does not justify mis-
alignments. It simply recommends to use non-directional research hypotheses.
This leads us to a fundamental issue, namely the normative question of whether
directional research hypotheses should be used in evidence-based medicine at all. For
instance, according to the principle of clinical equipoise, clinicians should not predict
what they will discover in clinical trials. They should not hypothesize that treatment
A is better than treatment B or than a placebo, etc. (for more on this principle see,
10 There are proposals for solving this problem, see, e.g., Lehmann and Romano 2005, pp. 229 ff.
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e.g., Freedman 1987; Djulbegovic 2009). Accordingly, clinicians should only use non-
directional research hypotheses (and only two-sided statistical tests). However, to
discuss this principle or the normative question in general would lead us too far afield
here. Either way, such normative principles do not justify the misalignments we are
interested in. They only favor non-directional research hypotheses.
To sum up, misalignments between a research hypothesis and its corresponding
statistical hypothesis seem to be favored by taught examples and common practices,
which are connected to theoretical reasons for using two-sided tests. Yet, none of
theses reasons justifies the misalignment practice. So, we proceed with considering
whether this practice poses a threat to evidence-based medicine.
5 do misalignments pose a threat to evidence-based medicine?
Employing a misaligned statistical hypothesis is methodologically flawed. It also
seems clear that one cannot gain proper evidence regarding the hypothesis that, say,
some medication is better than a placebo by examining whether there is any difference
whatsoever between the parameters of interest. A close alignment between a research
hypothesis and its statistical hypothesis seems to be methodologically essential. As
we have seen, there are also no justificatory reasons for the misalignments. One could
thus reason that the misalignments pose a threat to evidence-based medicine simply
by virtue of being a fundamental methodological flaw. But although we do not want
to diminish the issue of such a flaw, we follow a different approach. We want to
examine whether the misalignments are benign upon closer examination; they could
be counterbalanced by other factors.
In what follows, we first discuss promising counterbalancing factors for direction
misalignment and then promising counterbalancing factors for magnitude misalign-
ment. Our discussions are not only guided by methodological concerns but also by
considerations about medical research practice and considerations about informed
decision making by clinicians, physicians, and patients. After all, one main function of
hypothesis testing is to aid good clinical decision making.
5.1 Counterbalances for direction misalignment
direction misalignment occurs when the direction of the research hypothesis and
the direction of its ‘corresponding’ statistical hypothesis do not match. At first glance,
the toolbox of statistics offers a counterbalancing instrument for the discussed cases
where a direction research hypothesis is combined with a non-directional statistical
hypothesis. According to the so-called closure testing principle (Marcus et al. 1976),
if a two-sided p-value is statistically significant, one can subsequently conduct two
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one-sided tests using the same level α. Thereby, one could obtain the p-value that is
relevant for the directional research hypothesis.
But one should not celebrate too soon for at least three reasons. (i) Such a method
does not counterbalance all cases: Post hoc one-sided tests are only legitimate if
the two-sided test is statistically significant. If the two-sided test is non-significant,
the procedure stops without any further testing. So, although the procedure allows
for control of type I errors, the price to pay is a loss in power (cf. sect. 4.3). (ii)
Methodologically, it does not seem appropriate to change one’s statistical hypothesis
post hoc; one should decide whether to test one-sided or two-sided before analyzing
the data, as Altman urges (1991, p. 171) and as is required for preregistrations of trials
and studies. (iii) The post hoc move conflicts with classical principles of statistical
hypothesis testing, as outlined in section 2. For instance, if initially the effect is
supposed to be positive, but, in fact, it turns out to be negative, the closure testing
principle effectively leads to the rejection of the initial alternative hypothesis. This
contradicts the principle that evidence should only be used to disconfirm the null
hypothesis.
Regarding (i), one might object that in the case of non-significant p-values, the data
are not conclusive independent of the research hypothesis’ direction. It should thus be
no issue that the closure testing principle does not cover all cases. Yet, this is not the
case. A one-sided test result could be statistically significant although a two-sided test
result based on the same data is not.
One might also object that (ii) is not an issue. Instead of characterizing the closure
testing principle as a post hoc change of statistical hypotheses, one should construe
it as a new testing situation. One re-employs the data to conduct two one-sided
tests, where each corresponds to a different research hypothesis. If so, no alternative
hypothesis is being rejected. However, this change of research hypotheses is not part
of the closure testing principle. So, from the point of a research hypothesis evaluation,
the apparent remedy involves a dubious ad hoc move.
Up to this point, we have only considered p-values. In practice, as recommended
by guidelines for the conduct and reporting of clinical trials (e.g., ICH E9; Kirkwood
and Sterne 2003, ch. 8), not only the test decision, but also the precise p-values and,
most importantly, the effect size(s) (e.g., mean difference between treatment groups) or
confidence intervals should be considered. The final conclusion regarding the research
hypothesis is then the result of taking a number of different aspects of the evidence
into account. Given the fact that the p-value and the respective test decision only play
one role among others, one might wonder whether misalignments are more benign in
such scenarios. Can the dubious ad hoc move criticized in (ii) be counterbalanced by
considering effect sizes or the like? We think that it can be – at least to a substantial
degree. If one considers the effect size, one might have a good justification for doing a
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one-sided test that matches the effect size’s direction and for modifying one’s research
hypothesis. If so, our objection that the closure testing principle is methodologically
unmotivated is weakened. Yet, it is not rebutted, because changing one’s research
hypothesis is not part of a confirmatory testing setting.
Moreover, the other problematic issues are not mitigated; there is still no counterbal-
ance for non-statistically significant cases (and thus a loss of power), and there is still a
conflict with classical principles of statistical hypothesis testing. Analogous problems
of one- vs. two-sided testing arise in the case of using confidence intervals instead
of p-values, as well. For instance, using two-sided instead of one-sided confidence
intervals also means a loss in power (in some sense).
In addition to these methodological considerations, we would like to note that in
medical research practice the closure testing principle is not commonly used (at least
in our experience). One might think that this does not have any bad practical impact. If
one tests two-sided but observes a clearly positive effect, it might seem benign that
no closure testing principle was used. It just seems obvious that the treatment has
some positive effect. While this might be true when effect sizes are in fact considered,
the issue in medical research practice is that effect sizes have been neglected and
are still neglected (also for non-significant results). It is to be expected that there is
a substantial amount of published findings where the conclusions were exclusively
drawn based on the (two-sided) p-values.11 And if the effect sizes are not specified in
the study report, there is room for claiming that the test results (indirectly) ‘support’ a
directional research hypothesis about an improvement with a p-value that is statistically
significant due to negative effects. In light of various known issues with questionable
research practices, we thus doubt that effect size considerations have substantially
counterbalanced direction misalignment in practice.
To sum up: The result of our analysis is that direction misalignment cannot
be fully counterbalanced by the closure testing principle (combined with effect size
considerations), especially from a methodological, but also from an applied point of
view. This casts doubt on findings of studies that feature this kind of misalignment.
5.2 Counterbalances for magnitude misalignment
magnitude misalignment occurs when the statistical hypothesis does not reflect the
magnitude of the effect stated in the research hypothesis. At first glance, the toolbox
of statistics also offers a counterbalancing instrument for this kind of misalignment:
As we have mentioned, in the planning phase of a clinical study, it is mandatory to
calculate the minimum number of subjects that have to be included to detect a certain
11 Statistical significance still seems to play a dominant role in medical research insofar as that statistically
insignificant results are less frequently published (cf., e.g., Altman 1991, ch. 8.5.4, 15.5.2; Dwan et al.
2008) – this phenomenon is called ‘publication bias’.
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effect: the minimal clinically important difference (MCID), with the statistical power (1
- β) usually set to 80% or 90%. So, if the research hypothesis is merely concerned with
a clinically important difference and the sample has the appropriate size, a magnitude
misalignment might be be regarded as benign.
Yet, there are also at least three worries regarding this counterbalancing mean. (i)
Arguably, not all cases are covered by the MCID consideration; not all cases are just
about noticeable effects. Hypotheses about ‘significant improvements’ or ‘substantial
improvements’ go beyond a minimal clinically important difference.
(ii) A crucial question is whether MCID satisfyingly captures the use of qualitatively
evaluative terms like ‘better’ that are frequently used in research hypotheses. MCID
is aimed at accommodating for qualitative changes, but at least conceptually and
in practice MCID and qualitative differences could come apart. MCID is calculated
based on estimates. Typically, these are not based on patient-centered considerations,
but drawn from previous studies, subject-matter experts, or a given standard. If
available, meta-analyses may serve as a convenient means of obtaining estimates
not only of the effects, but also of nuisance parameters (e.g., variances). But for a
particular group of patients, fulfilling MCID might not lead to a qualitative change.
Consider a case where a three point difference on some quality-of-life scale is used
for determining the required sample size because this difference was the MCID in a
comparable study. This does not ensure that the three point difference is a qualitative
difference for the patients in question. In other words, MCID might be necessary
but not sufficient for capturing qualitative improvements. For capturing the latter, a
patient-centered approach is to be preferred, i.e., one would need to consider in more
detail the particular patients’ needs and expectations. These considerations might
not only apply to assessment of efficacy, but also to safety aspects: Some patients
might be willing to tolerate side effects the medical doctors would call severe, and
vice versa. In other words, there might be differences in the harm-benefit assessments.
This aspect is of particular importance for patients with diseases that have potentially
life-threatening consequences.
(iii) Not specifying the desired effect size in the statistical hypothesis leads to the
(potential) lack of crucial information. On the one hand, clinicians might disagree about
the MCID estimates. If such a disagreement is hidden in the sample size planning,
disagreements might easily be overlooked. On the other hand, not incorporating the
MCID estimate into the statistical hypotheses leads to a more difficult comparison
of two treatments. This loss of information can have bad practical consequences. A
physician or patient might decide for a risky treatment without realizing that the
potential benefits are minuscule from the patient’s point of view, etc. If the estimates
were reflected in the hypothesis, differences could be visible to everyone, including
patients who want to make an empirically informed decision about their treatments.
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So far, we neglected effect size considerations. What if we add them? Based on
the effect size, one could determine whether the MCID threshold has been reached.
Moreover, the variability of the effect sizes (in comparison to the risks and disad-
vantages of the treatment) is also valuable information for clinician, physicians, and
especially patients for informed decision making. Providing information about effect
sizes pointing in opposite directions, or about their corresponding variability plays
an essential role when it comes to formulating evidence-based recommendations (cf.,
e.g., Guyatt et al. 2008). Although we agree that considering effect sizes softens the
blow of magnitude misalignment, it does not solve the issue of the potential lack
of crucial information. And that this issue is non-benign for medical practice should
be evident from the fact that systematic reviews indicate that sample size calculation
issues are still poorly reported in a considerable number of publications (cf., e.g.,
Bariani et al. 2015). In our review, we also examined whether the required sample
sizes, in particular with regard to the hypothesized effect size, are provided. Only 3
papers report the MCID that was used for determining the required sample size. Even
in these rare cases, however, the MCID estimates were inferred from previous studies,
and not based on patient-centered considerations. The cited reviews also give reason
to believe that a substantial amount of studies might not be adequately powered. In
addition, and as discussed before, although effect sizes are strongly encouraged or
even required to be stated in study reports and publication, the interpretations and
conclusions of medical studies often focus on the (non-)significance of the testing
results instead of effect size considerations.
To sump up: The result of our analysis is that magnitude misalignment cannot
be fully counterbalanced by MCID considerations or sample size planning. On the one
hand, not all cases of magnitude misalignment are covered. On the other hand, both
methodologically and for informed clinical decision making, there is a danger of not
capturing the qualitative differences in the research hypotheses and of not displaying
important information. Our considerations cast doubt on findings of medical studies
that feature magnitude misalignment.
All in all, we conclude that misalignments pose a non-negligible threat to evidence-
based medicine. Our results especially cast doubt on findings of medical studies that
involve both direction misalignment and magnitude misalignment.
6 concluding remarks : consequences for clinicians’ theoretical
and practical reasoning
In this paper, we have identified four forms of misalignment between research hypothe-
ses and their statistical hypotheses, namely direction misalignment, magnitude
misalignment, operationalization misalignment, and testing misalignment.
We have focused on the first two, and we have identified two main reasons for the
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occurrence of such misalignments, namely that they are favored by common practices
(e.g., popular statistical tests, involuntarily misleading guidelines, or taught errors),
which are based on theoretical considerations in favor of two-sided tests. Our upshot
regarding whether such misalignments pose a threat to evidence-based medicine is
mixed. Some cases of misalignments can be partially counterbalanced and rendered
more benign. Yet, not all misalignments can be counterbalanced and the counterbal-
ancing instruments have severe disadvantages: They either lead to methodological
inadequacy (in addition to the misalignment) or involve a (potential) lack of infor-
mation that could be crucial for medical research, informed clinical decision making,
and patient-centered considerations. In addition, using two-sided tests for testing
directional hypotheses results in a loss of power. This means that potentially beneficial
treatments might be missed. Given the dominance of statistical significance in the
interpretation of medical studies, a non-significant result will most likely lead to
stopping the marketing application of the particular treatment under consideration,
and any further investigations might be considered unnecessary. Apart from that,
flaws in calculating the required sample size can still be found in a considerable
number of studies, which means that magnitude alignment might be a more serious
problem than it seems at first glance. This further influences statistical power and,
thus, might pose an additional threat to EBM in practice.
In view of these issues that misalignments face in addition to the flaw of a misalign-
ment on its own, we strongly recommend avoiding them. We propose five remedies
that can be applied to clinicians’ theoretical and practical thinking.
The first remedy is to urge clinicians to pay more attention to the relation between
their research hypotheses and the chosen statistical hypotheses – in teaching, in
regulatory guidelines, and in practice. Using two-sided tests should involve a non- or
bi-directional research hypothesis. If one wants to use directional research hypotheses,
one needs to test one-sided. If one does not want to use one-sided tests, one should
not specify directional research hypotheses.
The second remedy is to demand the preregistration of trials and studies. This
might also draw more attention to the adequacy of the chosen statistical hypothesis,
and it hampers what one could call ‘hypothesis hacking’: after statistical testing, one
specifies a research hypothesis that matches the testing results.12 In our experience,
this does not rarely occur.
The third remedy is concerned with magnitude misalignment. We suggest
incorporating the MCID estimate into the statistical hypotheses by using an alternative
hypothesis that is related to the effect size, e.g., H1 : µT − µP ≥ δ, or a point hypothesis
(cf. sect. 3). The results of such testings would be also a better guide for patients.
12 We owe this suggestion to a researcher in the audience of our talk at the 8th Philosophy of Medicine
Roundtable.
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Having good reason to believe that TMS has an effect of a size that is apt for the
patient’s needs is more informative than just having good reason to believe that TMS
has some unspecified effect. However, it might be more difficult to explain such
hypotheses to practitioners (since the alternative is restricted to one single value).
The third remedy might lead to more one-sided testing situations. Our fourth
remedy is indeed to re-consider using one-sided tests. Two-sided tests are the right
choice for many cases but presumably not for all. An important benefit of one-sided
tests is that the loss of power that two-sided tests face would be diminished. Although
their reasons for employing directional hypotheses (and one-side tests) must be clearly
stated and justified, researchers should not be afraid of using one-sided tests. They
should also keep in mind that sacrificing power for little reason might also be unethical
because potentially promising new treatment approaches are likely to be overlooked.
However, we think that two important conditions for using one-sided tests are as
follows: (i) The test needs to be rigorous enough. As mentioned in section 4.3, the use
of one-sided tests is criticized for its ‘fishing for significance’ potential. But one could
simply test with half of α to obtain appropriate rigor (cf. ICH E9, sect. 5.5). (ii) The
test needs to fit the confirmatory testing setting. For instance, Ruxton and Neuha¨user
(2010) propose a decision criterion for using a one-sided test: If a significant effect
in the opposite direction yields the same consequences as no effect, a one-sided test
can be used. This could be sensible in many frequently encountered situations in
medical research. For instance, when evaluating safety outcomes, it is important to
detect effects in both directions. However, when the main interest is on efficacy, the
consequences of a non-significant one-sided test result might be the same, regardless
whether the effect is 0 or opposite to the initial assumption: the marketing application
of the treatment would be stopped. Such a decision criterion could also used be in
preregistration to justify the use of one-sided tests.
Last but not least, we suggest as a fifth remedy that clinicians should better distin-
guish confirmatory statistical settings from exploratory ones. Statistical testing is not
limited to disconfirming hypotheses. It can be also used for exploring one’s data set.
Moreover, in some cases, clinicians can also rely more on descriptive statistics. For
instance, when it comes to safety and tolerability, guidelines suggest “[...] applying
descriptive statistical methods to the data, supplemented by calculation of confidence
intervals wherever this aids interpretation” (ICH E9, section 6.4). Yet, descriptive statis-
tics cannot replace inferential statistics. Despite all the potential problems associated
with hypothesis testing, its merits must be taken into account (e.g., accommodating
by-chance variability).
In our opinion, all stakeholders in medical research should move the ‘scientific
paradigm’ toward a multi-factorial decision model, with an eye on the interpretation
of the effect size and its clinical relevance. This does not mean that hypothesis testing
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should be banned from research. p-values or confidence intervals and effect size
estimation are two aspects of the available evidence, which are complementary to each
other. With respect to patient-physician communication and involvement of patients
into clinical decisions, placing more emphasis on effect sizes is crucial: A SCI patient
is primarily interested in the improvement of motor function that can be expected ‘on
average’ for a particular treatment. Her or his decision will be mostly based on this
aspect – and so should the treating physician’s decision be. Clinicians should thus
be encouraged to provide detailed and reliable information about how one therapy
compares to another with respect to the clinical outcome (e.g., improvement in gait
performance, bladder function, quality of life). Especially in rare disease settings
such as SCI, however, the number of subjects are usually small, which leads to a
considerable impact of by-chance variation. Therefore, it is especially important to
consider the variability of the effect size. This can be communicated and explained
to the patients by referring to analogous paradigmatic examples from daily life (e.g.,
uncertainty in the results of opinion polls). Moreover, especially in rare diseases,
case reports or series represent a substantial amount of the evidence that is used
for clinical decision-making. These data might also facilitate emphasizing the inter-
individual differences in the communication with patients. Case series provide useful
additional evidence, complementing the results from clinical trials, which naturally
yield summary statements about the treatment efficacy ‘on average’ rather than being
focused on evaluations at the single-subject level.
We have deliberately considered only one problem, namely misalignments of
research and statistical hypotheses, within the broad topic of medical data analysis.
It is needless to say that the paper thus could not serve as a critical appraisal of the
methodological and statistical quality of evidence in SCI or medical research in general.
Moreover, we did not take into account that often not a single research hypothesis is
considered. In such cases, the corresponding statistical hypotheses would be more
complex. We have also only considered a frequentist framework. In future research, it
is worth examining if analogous problems arise for Bayesian accounts.
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